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Strategies and Approaches of International Financial 






The paper focuses on the strategies and approaches of the main international financial institutions (IFIs) – the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank – towards reforms in the Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries, 
namely, Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine. It assesses the main principles, goals, policy instruments, conditionalities 
and the target groups of these IFIs in their interaction with the authorities of the three countries and the 
implementation of country support programs. The two core questions that guide the analysis are, first, the role 
of IFIs in supporting economic and institutional reforms, which aim at transforming limited access orders into 
open access orders, and, second, these IFIs’ interaction with other external actors, such as the European Union, 
that are present in the EaP countries. In addition to the traditional advice on fiscal consolidation and structural 
reforms, the IFIs have been focused on banking and energy reforms, as rent-seeking and corruption were 
especially wide-spread in these sectors. Increasing focus on policies aimed at reducing corruption, in particular 
in the case of Ukraine, is among the most notable features of the IFIs’ operation in those countries. However, 
such measures often risked being implemented only ‘on paper’, especially after the financial pressure on the 
ruling elite in recipient countries decreased. The attempts to broaden the political and societal support for agreed 
policy reforms have become another exceptional element of the support strategy practiced by the IFIs in the EaP 
countries, in particular in Ukraine. In the latter case, the negotiated arrangements were discussed not only with 
key figures from the ruling elite and responsible institutions but also with the opposition, societal activists and 
other important stakeholders. Despite attempts at broadening reform ownership and coordination with other 
external donors, the actual effects of the IFIs’ strategies on transition reforms have been limited, as evidenced 
by a history of half-implemented and sometimes reversed policy measures. 
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There are a number of international financial institutions (IFIs) active in the Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries. 
Some are multilateral organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB), 
others are regional (European) institutions such as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD) and the European Investment Bank (EIB). This paper focuses on the strategies and approaches of the IMF 
and the WB since they, particularly the former, have been prominent providers of financial and technical support, 
often coordinating their activities among themselves and with the European Union (EU) and European financial 
institutions, and have also been watched for country assessments by financial markets and investors active in 
those countries. In particular, during the initial years of transition reforms in 1990s, the IMF and the WB were 
seen as “the leading international organizations assisting countries in their actual transition” (Aslund 2013: 153).  
 
The main hypothesis of this paper is that the IFIs have been consistent external supporters of reforms aimed at 
macro-stabilization (assistance in dealing with balance of payments difficulties, which is the main criteria for the 
involvement of the IMF), opening the economic environment to competition, and transforming previously 
restrictive institutions. These institutions, which had benefited ruling elites and allowed rent-seeking, were 
transformed into open access impersonal institutions based on the rule of law, protection of property rights, 
open competition and wider diffusion of economic gains. As has been argued by North et al. (2009: 23), 
“impersonal markets and exchange … are features of open access societies”.  
 
This focus on competitive markets and open trade policy reflects a decades long consensus among advisers and 
technocrats of economic and institutional reforms. Such consensus has been summarized in a classical volume 
on political economy of reforms as “stabilization where needed, liberalization and opening up everywhere – 
irrespective of whether a country might in the past have been classified as an industrial country, whether it had 
been part of the socialist bloc, or whether it had been poor in the mid-1950s when the world was declared 
divided into three” (Bergsten and Williamson 1994: 4). Research into the operation of the IMF has also shown 
the importance that it has traditionally attached to the opening of external trade measures as conditions for 
country support programs (see Wei and Zhang 2006). After several financial crises in recent decades, especially 
the Asian financial crisis in 1998 and the global financial crisis of 2008, the dominant ideas in the IFIs evolved 
towards a more cautious approach regarding the liberalization of the capital account. The approach has moved 
towards more emphasis being given to the regulation and quality of institutions supervising financial markets, as 
well as to the redistributive effects of competition, anticyclical policies and a more active role for the state in 
dealing with social issues. The consensus on the importance of open economy and need for market based 
restructuring has remained relatively strong. 
 
The work of North et al. (2009) maintains that different social orders – limited access orders (LAOs) and open 
access orders (OAOs) – operate on the basis of different logic and in different institutional contexts, and this has 
important implications for the prospects of transition from one type of the social order into another. 
Nevertheless, they still see easy entry conditions and competition as the main features of the OAO and, one can 
argue, as the goals of economic and institutional reforms. The reduction of barriers to foreign trade and 
                                                          
1 The author is grateful to Esther Ademmer, Rimtautas Bartkus, Marijus Bernatavičius, Klaudijus Maniokas, Aušra 
Rauličkytė, Elyssa Shea, Marius Vismantas, Hannah Fabri, and Max Schneider for their comments and 
suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies.  
 Strategies and Approaches of International Financial Institutions towards Eastern Partnership Countries| 7 
 
investments as well as streamlining domestic regulations to reduce administrative barriers, which make market 
entry costly and create opportunities for rent-creation, have traditionally formed the backbone of the support 
programs advocated by the IMF and the WB. These IFIs have thus sometimes been described as “champions of 
globalization and economic liberalization” (Broome 2014: 67).  
 
It should be noted that the paper does not discuss the general issues related to the functions of IFIs, their role in 
the international system, interaction with sovereign countries, or controversies surrounding the policy ideas that 
they promote and the effects they have (for those general debates see, for example, Broome 2014: 62-79). The 
analysis is guided by examining, first, the role of IFIs in supporting economic and institutional reforms, which aim 
at transforming LAOs into OAOs, and, second, the IFIs’ interactions with other external actors that are present in 
the EaP countries. This comparative study contributes to the literature on the political economy of reforms and 
the role of external actors by examining approaches and strategies of the IMF and the WB in the EaP countries. 
In contrast to the thinking prevailing in the literature on economic development and the role of IFIs, which has 
often seen the IFIs as important instruments of the US and other Western countries in transforming recipient 
countries, this study exposes the limits of the influence of those external actors. The limits become evident when 
domestic ruling elites in the recipient countries are reluctant to proceed with reforms that might threaten their 
rent-accumulation and power positions. By focusing on a series of half implemented agreements between the 
IFIs and EaP countries, the analysis also shows how the focus of these agreements and the conditionalities within 
them have evolved. This evolution occurred with the growing attention that the IFIs have given to governance 
issues, in particular to the reduction of opportunities for corruption and rent-seeking. It was the IFIs’ relations 
with Ukraine that led to growing acknowledgement of the need to not only improve the capacities of recipient 
institutions, but to acknowledge the presence of large scale corruption practices. These practices severely 
impaired the incentives to transform the societal order and open it up to competition and transparent 
transactions. This experience extended beyond the relationship with just one singular country and had broader 
effects on the IFIs’ operations in their member countries. 
 
The role of the IFIs and their interactions with other external actors is addressed below by discussing the main 
elements of the strategies of the IMF and the WB in three EaP countries – Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine. 
Although all three countries became members of those IFIs in 1992, the degree and the nature of their 
involvement differed depending on the domestic political and economic situation as well as on the influence of 
other external actors.  
 
Belarus has had the most limited record of transition reforms, while Moldova and Ukraine are characterized as 
gradual reformers (Havrylyshyn et al. 2016: 7). In Belarus, two stand-by agreements (SBAs) were concluded with 
the IMF in the early-mid 1990s (in 1993 and 1995). However, since then the role of the IFIs was limited due to 
contradictions between conditions set by the IMF and national policy priorities of Belarus (Dobrinsky 2016). 
Cooperation with the WB has been somewhat more intense and focused on sectors such as health care, 
environment and infrastructure (Ibid.). Interest in cooperation with the IMF was revived when the country’s 
ruling elites turned for support in the face of external shocks in 2008 but after the economic situation improved 
many reforms discussed in the country assistance program were not implemented.  
 
Moldova’s relationship with the IFIs has been relatively intense since 1993, when several agreements with the 
IMF were approved (Compensatory and Contingency Financing Facility, Systemic Transformation Facility and 
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Stand-By Arrangement). In the following years, another SBA (1995), an Extended Fund Facility (1996, 2010 and 
2016) and a Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (2000 and 2006) – from 2009 called Extended Credit Facility 
(2010 and 2016) – were agreed upon. Despite recommendations provided by the IMF, usually in coordination 
with the WB and other institutions like the EBRD, to accelerate the opening of the economy and structural 
changes, price liberalization, privatization and governance reforms, Moldova’s authorities pursued gradual 
reforms during most of the time until 2010. These were often assessed by the IFIs as satisfactory, despite 
slippages (see, for example, IMF 2007a and IMF 2008). Some analysts and NGOs have criticized the Moldovan 
government’s reform policies as formal changes without actual implementation of reforms in economic policy 
and judicial institutions “when they implied real political costs or jeopardized the dominant position and control 
over institutions” (Ghinea and Chirila 2010: 15). Despite periods of economic growth, such as from 2006 to 2008, 
Moldova remained one of the poorest countries in Europe with relatively high emigration, inefficient governance 
and pervasive corruption. 
 
Ukraine, like Moldova, Armenia, Georgia and some other Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries, 
followed the path of gradual transition reforms. It had a number of arrangements with the IMF, mostly SBAs, in 
1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 2004, 2008, 2010, 2014, 2015 and most recently in 2018. Most of those 
agreements were only partially implemented and only part of the loans were disbursed, as after the first few 
tranches were paid, it was routinely discovered that the country’s authorities had failed to deliver reform 
commitments. By 2005, only three out of 13 reviews were completed on time and without waivers, and the 
programs were off-track more than 85 % of the time (IMF 2005). The early years of the WB engagement with 
Ukrainian authorities throughout 1990 were also characterized as “only partially effective” with disbursement 
ratios from the Country Assistance Program of 1996-99 being significantly lower than in other CIS countries, the 
resource cost in supervising programs and projects being 50 % higher than the regional average and many 
prepared projects not materializing at all (World Bank 2000: i).  
 
This brief overview of the early involvement of the IFIs in those transition countries shows the limited 
effectiveness of country support programs, and, in the case of Belarus, the limited involvement of those 
institutions due to the relatively good economic conditions and divergent policy priorities of ruling elites. 
However, in the late 2000s all three countries experienced significant negative effects of global financial crisis 
and all three turned again to the IMF for assistance. Moreover, in Moldova and in Ukraine changes in ruling 
coalitions provided windows of opportunity to accelerate transition reforms by taking advantage of IFIs resources 
and policy advice. The paper therefore discusses in detail the IFI strategies that were adopted for each country 
and compares their main elements, focusing on concrete policy advice and conditions in terms of policy reforms 
that were set for the financial assistance to become available.  
 
The paper is structured in such a way as to allow comparison of the key elements of the strategies of the IFIs 
towards selected EaP countries. It starts with an overview of the main principles and goals of IFIs generally and 
concretely towards those countries, before presenting the instruments and resources as well as actors in those 
countries with whom representatives of those institutions interact. The paper concludes by presenting the main 
findings on the IFIs’ strategies towards Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine. It underlines the similarities and 
differences in terms of policies and sectoral focus in light of the hypothesis on the IFIs’ support for these 
countries’ transitions towards more open economies with greater competition and easier entry conditions. 
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2. Guiding Principles and Goals of the IMF and the WB 
 
The IMF and the WB are both multilateral financial institutions established in the aftermath of World War II as 
part of the Bretton Woods international architecture to govern financial relations between its (initially Western 
world) members, seeking global monetary stability and fostering economic growth. The IMF has traditionally 
dealt mostly with the stability of exchange rates and international payments while the WB (formally a group of 
five organizations) focused on developmental policies, the reduction of poverty, and contributing to economic 
growth. Their membership extends to the absolute majority of the countries in the world (currently 189), just a 
few countries short of all United Nations members. In more than 70 years of operation, both institutions have 
gone through an evolution of their roles in response to the needs of their clients and to a changing international 
economic situation, in particular, different types of crises (for a long-term assessment of the evolution of the IMF 
and the WB, see Boughton 2004; Krueger 1997; Reinhart and Trebesch 2015).   
 
The rise of new economic powers, first of all China, in recent decades, has brought forth a debate on the relative 
weight of the United States (US) and other advanced economies inside of those IFIs, as compared to the 
underrepresented emerging markets. Criticism regarding the Western bias of the IMF and other multilateral 
institutions was mostly based on the argument that there is a mismatch between the growing share of emerging 
markets in the global economy, especially Asian, and their share of votes within those organizations (see 
Rachman 2017: 229-231). The IMF and other global institutions were also criticized by the then Russian President 
Dmitri Medvedev, who reportedly called them “discredited”, in 2008 (Forsberg and Haukkala 2016: 90). The 
criticism towards IFIs resulted in several revisions of the IMF in 2010, with quotas and voting shares going 
downwards for advanced economies. The latter still retain around 57 % of quota shares and voting shares (IMF 
2018a).  
 
The general mission of the IMF is to ensure the stability of the international monetary system by keeping track 
of the global economy and national economies, lending to countries with balance of payments difficulties, and 
giving technical assistance to its member states (IMF 2018). The two main goals of the WB include ending 
extreme poverty by 2030 by decreasing the percentage of people living on less than $1,90 a day to no more than 
three per cent and fostering income growth of the bottom 40 % for every country (World Bank 2018). It provides 
low-interest loans, zero to low-interest credits and grants to developing countries to support investments in 
education, health care, public administration, infrastructure, financial and private sector development, 
agriculture, environment and natural resource management. Similarly to the IMF, it also offers economic policy 
advice, research and analysis as well as technical assistance. Indicators such as ‘Doing Business’ and ‘Quality of 
Governance’ are examples of analytical tools that help reforming countries to benchmark themselves against the 
others and track reform progress over time.  
 
As was mentioned before, the IMF and the WB have been active in Central and Eastern Europe since the start of 
transition reforms in early 1990s, with most countries in the region becoming members around 1992 (see 
Diagram 1). The general goal of the IMF and the WB was to assist those countries in their transformation from 
centrally planned economies into the market economies and institutions that are characteristic to the Western 
OAO societies. The end of the Cold War and the start of transition reforms not only meant an increase in the 
membership of the IMF and the WB, they also reinforced their importance in terms of the demand for their 
services and the prospect that their policy prescriptions could be diffused more widely. The recognition of the 
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demand for technical and financial assistance in the region is also reflected by the establishment of the EBRD, 
which became an important partner institution for the IMF and the WB. 
 
However, soon the divergence of transformation trajectories emerged within this group of post-Communist 
countries. On the one hand, Central European countries, including the Baltic States, sustained reforms and used 
EU and NATO accession processes to consolidate them. On the other hand, Eastern European countries, 
belonging to the CIS, increasingly lagged behind (for a recent analysis of such a divergence see Hartwell (2016), 
who compares trajectories of transition reforms of Poland and Ukraine). In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the 
former group of countries exited most support programs of the IMF and the WB, maintaining channels of 
cooperation characteristic to members during normal times and regular meetings such as the IMF Article IV 
consultations. EU membership resulted in EU financial support becoming the main source of external funding for 
developmental needs. It was only after the global financial crisis in 2008 that some EU members in this region 
(i.e. Latvia, Hungary, Romania) again turned for the temporary financial assistance to the IMF.  
 
Diagram 1. The timeline of IMF membership and programs 
 
Source: IMF (2014a: 8). 
 
Meanwhile, CIS countries were increasingly left behind in terms of most transition indicators (‘lost in transition’ 
as described by the EBRD in 2016). The absence of the credible external incentives, such as EU and NATO 
membership, has been used as a popular explanation for these divergences in transition trajectories (‘the great 
divide’ as it was called by some – see Sonin 2013). However, it is important to note another explanation of this 
‘development trap’, one which points to the emergence of winners from initial reforms, especially privatization 
and inefficient political institutions, such as so-called oligarchs, who, rather than the populists elected by losers 
of transition, became the main force resisting further reforms. As argued by the IMF staff, reforms were stalled 
or only partially implemented due to the emergence and consolidation of rent-seeking elites, often representing 
former Soviet nomenklatura and bureaucratic veto players, strong enough to prevent implementation of reforms 
which could threaten their interests and dominant positions (Havrylyshyn and Odling-Smee 2000).  
 
After discussing possible internal and external factors that could incentivize those with vested interests to 
support reforms, IMF analysts called for using every possible option to move Eastern European countries towards 
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“fuller liberalization of markets, greater competition, and the removal of privileges like tax exemptions or rent-
creating government regulations that favour vested interests” (Ibid.). Similar advice was provided by the WB in 
the mid-1990s in one of its most prominent reports “From Plan to Market”, which provided a systematic overview 
of recommended transition reforms for the Central and Eastern European countries. The WB report argued “that 
both extensive liberalization and determined stabilization are needed for improved productivity and growth and 
that sustaining these policies requires rapid structural change as well as institutional reforms” (World Bank 1996: 
5). Economic liberalization advocated by the WB covered three areas: domestic prices and markets, foreign trade 
and currency convertibility, and openness to new business entry. Progress in opening up these areas together 
with reforms of property rights, private ownership, institutions and social policy formed the basis for assessing 
the progress in transition reforms, according to the WB. For example, on the basis of the comparison of fast trade 
liberalization by Estonia and slow liberalization by Ukraine in the early 1990s, the report concluded that “rapid 
trade liberalization pays off” while “slow trade liberalization imposes high costs” (World Bank 1996: 31). To 
reinforce the message about the importance of external liberalization, the report also stressed that 
“international integration is vital for successful reform in transition countries” (World Bank 1996: 145).  
 
To sum up, it has been observed that the 25 years of transition reforms in the region provide a basis to argue 
that rapid reformers ended up with better institutions than gradual reformers. This confirmed the thesis that 
political elites who were committed to economic liberalization were also committed to subsequent institutional 
development, while political elites who advocated gradual reforms often did so to extract rents from the 
economy, resulting in the formation of oligarchic classes (Havrylyshyn et al. 2016). 
 
The ‘vital’ role of the IFIs, in particular the IMF, for successful reforms in Eastern European countries has been 
reconfirmed more recently by analysts who stressed their role in “setting standards, providing relevant policy 
advice, evaluating outcomes, and providing financing” (Aslund 2013: 251). In particular, after Maidan events in 
Ukraine in 2014, the political, security and economic crisis of the country revived interest in policy advice that 
was recommended to the transition countries in early 1990s. This included the role played by the IMF in providing 
funding to stabilize the macroeconomic environment and assisting in implementing fast reforms, in particular 
reforming corrupt institutions, opening up the economy, reforming public finances, energy, land use and other 
areas dominated by entrenched rent-accumulating elites (Aslund 2015).  
 
Thus, during the recent decade, the IMF assumed its usual role of crisis management and enforcer of policy 
reforms, while at the same time acting as a mediator between Ukrainian institutions and external creditors. 
Differences in the domestic situation in Belarus or Moldova compared to post-Maidan Ukraine impacted the role 
played by the IMF and the WB, as reflected in their strategies towards these countries.    
 
 
3. Objectives, Instruments and Resources 
 
The discussion below focuses on the strategies of the IMF and the WB in Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine adopted 
in recent years. Due to the nature and objectives of the IFIs, their strategies deal directly with financial 
stabilization and structural reforms, which often has a direct or indirect impact on sectors such as trade, 
sometimes energy (through conditions on price liberalization, market access or privatization), or, to much less 
extent, on migration and especially security, which is a domain of organizations like the OSCE and NATO.  
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The IMF and the WB operate by setting concrete objectives in particular policy areas for countries that receive 
their financial and technical support. As the more detailed analysis of their strategies towards Belarus, Moldova 
and Ukraine below reveals, the IMF aims at supporting the stabilization of the macroeconomic environment and 
the functioning of financial sector, at consolidating public finances and at improving conditions for economic 
development. The latter often includes measures aimed at removing barriers to market activities, reforming 
institutions to reduce possibilities for rent-seeking and corruption. The WB aims at supporting sectors which are 
important for economic development ranging from infrastructure such as transport and energy to education, 
health care, social support and environmental policies.  
 
The main instruments and resources, which are used in their country strategies, include financial support (low 
interest rates loans) and technical advice on policy and institutional reforms. Financial support is provided under 
conditions that take into account the particular country’s situation while at the same time reflecting program 
objectives and the mission of the IFI. According to the IMF guidelines, conditionality “is intended to ensure that 
Fund resources are provided to its members to assist them in resolving their balance of payments problems in a 
manner that is consistent with the Fund’s Article and that establishes adequate safeguards for the temporary 
use of the Fund’s resources” (IMF 2002: 1). The Fund-supported programs are directed primarily towards solving 
a country’s balance of payments problems and “achieving its medium-term external viability while fostering 
sustainable economic growth” (IMF 2002: 2).  
 
Conditions are usually established on the basis of these macroeconomic variables and structural measures which 
are within a country’s direct or indirect control. These variables and measures are of critical importance for 
achieving the aims of the program or for monitoring the implementation of the program, and they are necessary 
for the implementation of the Articles (Ibid.). The core areas of the Fund’s responsibility comprise 
macroeconomic stabilization, monetary, fiscal and exchange rate policies including the underlying institutional 
arrangements and related structural measures, and financial system issues. In cases where variables and 
measures are not within the core areas of the IMF, it draws on the advice of other IFIs, particularly the WB, using 
the framework of ‘a lead agency’. The implementation of the support arrangements can be monitored on the 
basis of prior actions, performance criteria, program and other reviews, and other variables and measures 
established as structural benchmarks or indicative targets (Ibid.). The Table 1 below provides a comparative 
overview of selected IMF country programs with Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine to illustrate what type of 
conditions and monitoring procedures have been used by the Fund.  
 
Table 1. Comparison of selected IMF country programs with Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine 
 Belarus (SBA 2009) Moldova (ECF/EFF 2010) Ukraine (SBA 2014) 
Objectives To facilitate an orderly adjustment 
to external shocks and address 
pressing vulnerabilities; to advance 
structural reforms. 
To reverse the structural fiscal 
deterioration that occurred in from 
2008 to 2009 while safeguarding 
funds for public investment and 
priority social spending; to keep 
inflation under control while 
rebuilding foreign reserves to 
cushion the economy from external 
shocks; to ensure financial stability 
To restore macroeconomic 
stability; to strengthen economic 
governance and transparency; to 
lay the foundations for robust and 
sustainable economic growth. 
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by enabling the early detection of 
problems and strengthening the 
framework for bank rehabilitation 
and resolution; to raise the 








































Devaluation of Belarus rubel 
against US dollar by 20 % and 
shifting exchange rate peg from US 
dollar to a basket of currencies; 
abolishment of the ceiling on 
lending rates by banks to the 
corporate sector; amendment of 
legislation to prohibit the central 
government from making 
additional transfers to its deposit 
accounts with commercial banks; 
approval of a central government 
budget for 2009 targeting a zero 
budget deficit; limiting wage 
increases for budgetary workers in 


















Floor on net international reserves; 
ceiling on the net domestic assets 
of the National Bank of the 
 
Parliamentary passage of an 
amended 2009 budget and 2010 
budget with a deficit in line with 
memorandum, amendments to 
Budget System Wage Law 355 to 
bring wages in line with the wage 
bill allocation in the 2010 budget; 
the National Bank of Moldova’s 
(NBM) net international reserves 
will amount to $1300 million by 
end-December; parliamentary 
passage of legislation transferring 
to the National Energy Regulation 
Agency (ANRE) the authority to set 
tariffs for heat directly, rather than 
indirectly through municipalities; 
the new heating tariff to be set by 
ANRE by January 14, 2010, will 
cover at least amortization and all 














Ceiling on the overall cash deficit of 
the general government; ceiling on 
net domestic assets of the NBM; 
 
National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) 
adopting a regulation related to the 
method of calculation of official 
exchange rate, instructing the 
largest 35 banks to launch 
diagnostic studies; NBU Council 
establishing an independent audit 
committee to provide internal 
oversight; government approving a 
package of revenue and 
expenditure measures yielding a 
UAH 45 billion and implementing it 
by passing a supplementary 
budget; the parliament passing a 
public procurement law by 
strengthening checks and balances 
and decreasing a number of 
exemptions; another law on VAT to 
reverse recently introduced rate 
reduction to keep the rate at 20 %; 
gas price regulator to adopt and 
officially publish a decision to raise 
end-user gas tariffs for households 
by 56 % by May 2014; utility price 
regulatory to adopt the decision to 
raise heating tariffs for households 
by average 40 % by July 2014; 
government approving the decision 
to introduce a new social assistance 
scheme to compensate the effects 
of those increases for the most 
vulnerable. 
 
Floor on net international reserves; 
ceiling on net domestic assets; 
ceiling on the cash deficit of the 

















Republic of Belarus (NBRB); ceiling 
on the central government budget 
deficit.  
Non-accumulation of external 
arrears, avoidance of exchange 
restrictions, multiple currency 







Hiring of a consultant to assist in 
the sale of shares in key state-
owned banks; bringing loan 
classification in line with best 
practices; eliminating the 
regulatory act imposing a ceiling on 
price increases of 0.5 per cent and 
refraining from establishing any 
new extra-budgetary funds.  
floor on net international reserves 
of the NBM; ceiling on contracting 
or guaranteeing of non-
concessional external debt of the 
general government; ceiling on 
accumulation of external payment 
arrears; ceiling on reserve money, 
on change in domestic expenditure 
arrears of general government, on 
the general government wage bill; 
floor on priority social spending of 
the general government.   
 
Cabinet approval and submission 
to the parliament of amendments 
to the Law on Financial Institutions 
to strengthen the tools available to 
resolve problem banks; the NBM 
will collect and share with IMF the 
results of the ongoing diagnostic 
studies in all banks; the Cabinet 
adoption of a plan for a speedy 
expansion of the new target social 
assistance system to cover at least 
2/3 of all eligible recipients by the 
end of 2010; Cabinet approval and 
submission to parliament of 
amendments to the Law about 
guaranteeing the deposits of 
physical persons in the banking 
system with early access in the 
event of bank failure.  
general government; ceiling on 
publicly guaranteed debt; non-
accumulation of external debt 
payments arrears by the general 
government; ceiling on monetary 








Complete diagnostic studies and 
review of business plans for the 
largest 15 banks; agreement 
between the government and NBU 
and the IMF staff reached on 
criteria when public money could 
be used to bring a weak bank back 
into solvency; a special unit set up 
in the Ministry of Finance to 
manage financial sector 
shareholdings; proposals for the 
VAT in agricultural sector to bring it 
closer to general VAT regime; audit 
of Naftogaz operations; legislation 
passed to improve payment 
discipline in the heating sector; 
design and implementations of 
laws and regulation on business 
climate, the effectiveness of the 
judiciary and tax administration 
Review 
procedures 
Total of 15-months with quarterly 
reviews, with a possibility of 
successor EFF program to continue 
implementing structural reforms 
Each program running for 36-
months with semi-annual reviews 
Total of 24-months with the first 
two bi-monthly reviews and later 
quarterly reviews 
Resources $2.46 billion (SDR 1.62 or 418.8 % 
of Belarus quota), $787.9 million 
released immediately 
$588 million (SDR 369.6 or 300 % of 
Moldova’s quota) split equally 
between two facilities, SDR 60 
million released immediately 
$17.1 billion (SDR 10.976 or 800 % 
of Ukraine’s quota), $3.2 billion 
made available immediately 





SBA linked to triggering funds from 
the WB ($200 million) and the EU 
(€200 of macro financial 
assistance). 
Support coordinated with other 
donors – the WB, the EU, EIB, EBRD 
that were expected to contribute 
the same amount as IMF. 
Support coordinated with the WB, 
the EU, the US, Japan, Canada and 
China with funding from those 
sources projected to exceed $6 
billion in 2014 and $5 billion in 
2015. 
Source: IMF (2009), IMF (2010), IMF (2014b) 
 
The comparison of IMF country programs shows that the Fund consistently focuses on macroeconomic stability 
and conditions for restoring economic growth. These objectives are aimed at by setting parameters for monetary 
and exchange rate policies, the financial sector stability, fiscal payments and adjustments, energy sector reforms 
to reduce fiscal drag and increase its efficiency, and the improvement of the regulatory quality and independence 
of the central banks and other regulatory institutions. In the case of Moldova and in particular Ukraine, strong 
emphasis has been placed on anti-money laundering activities, anti-corruption actions, seeking recovery of 
stolen assets, increasing the transparency of government operations and on the governance of energy 
companies, banks and other state owned organizations. The conditions in terms of prior actions usually include 
legal and organizational measures to consolidate public finances and deal with financial sector vulnerabilities. 
There are also measures and benchmarks foreseen to reduce distortions in the economy and improve business 
environment, although their implementation as well as improvements in governance and elimination of 
incentives for corruption has been partial or absent as it will be discussed below. The Fund programs are 
coordinated with the WB, the EU and other institutions such as the EBRD and the EIB, and sometimes with donors 
like the US, Japan, Canada and China. 
 
Conditionality is seen as an element of a broader strategy for supporting members in their economic and financial 
policies, which is supplemented by formal and informal consultations, multilateral surveillance, advice on the 
voluntary adoption of rules and codes of conduct, and the provision of other technical assistance. Some authors 
make a distinction between the external influences of IFIs with respect to the content of reform programs 
(intellectual and technical advice) and mobilizing internal support for those programs (money in exchange for 
reforms), arguing that sometimes the latter can be much more important than the former (Balcerowicz 1994: 
175). The IMF and development banks have been seen as performing a useful role of external pressure, for 
example, by using conditionality when “the offer of financial assistance by an external agency gives reform-
minded policymakers within the government extra leverage in winning internal arguments” (Williamson 1994: 
25), or by making the reform programs internationally more credible and helping to consolidate them. It should 
be noted, that the IMF and the WB have been criticized for sometimes providing grants without conditions and 
programs attached, or relying too much on the effective and transparent decision-making of domestic ruling 
elites and bureaucracies (see Sachs 1994).  
 
Table 2 provides a comparison of the engagement of the WB with Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine, drawing on its 
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Table 2. The WB country partnerships with Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine 
 Belarus Moldova Ukraine 
Objectives Increasing the competitiveness of 
the economy by supporting 
structural reforms, including 
reducing the role of state, 
transforming the state-owned 
enterprises, promoting private and 
financial sector development and 
integration into the world 
economy; improving the quality 
and efficiency of public 
infrastructure services and the use 
of agricultural and forestry 
resources, and increasing global 
public goods benefits; enhancing 
human development outcomes 
through better education, health 
and social services. 
Strengthening the rule of law and 
accountability in economic 
institutions; improving inclusive 
access to and the efficiency and 
quality of public services; 
enhancing the quality and 
relevance of education and 
training for job-relevant skills. 
Ensuring that markets work more 
effectively; establishing necessary 
conditions for fiscal and financial 
stability; improving service 
delivery for all Ukrainians. 
Particular focus on promoting 
good governance, transparency 
and accountability in public sector; 
stability in the banking sector; 
reduction in the cost of doing 
business; and effective use of 








Upgraded road of 53 km between 
Minsk and Bobrujsk and 154 km of 
the road linking Minsk and Grodno 
to be upgraded by 2019 to reduce 
transport costs for users and 
accidents; modern mechanical 
waste separation plant 
constructed in Grodno; about 
324,000 people in 20 districts 
across country to be connected to 
clean and reliable water services 
by 2019; 243,000 people will 
benefit from energy efficiency in 
heating and power generation by 
2018; 79,000 of people living in 13 
towns benefit from the efficient 
use of biomass in heat and 
electricity generation by 2019; 4.5 
million hectares of forests outside 
protected areas will be managed 
as biodiversity friendly by 2020; by 
2018 Belarus will participate in the 
internally recognized Program for 
International Student Assessment 
Modernization of Government 
services to improve access, 
efficiency and delivery quality of 
administrative services through 
the re-engineering, digitization 
and creation of points for assisted 
service delivery at the local level; 
tax administration modernization 
project to improve revenue 
collection, tax compliance and 
taxpayer services by 
automatization and integration; a 
comprehensive diagnostic of the 
state-owned enterprises to 
improve their performance and 
quality of service delivery; 
strengthening the effectiveness of 
the social safety net. 
Anti-corruption reform by 
introducing e-declarations; 
improving district heating, water 
and sanitation services; health care 
and social protection; power 
transmission networks and road 
infrastructure. 
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(PISA); 150 micro, small and 
medium enterprises will get 
funding by 2022; and e-health 
system will become operational 
and by 2022 the medical 
simulation centre will be 
established.    
Resources Bank (IBRD) portfolio included 9 
loans lending $991 million, GEF 
grant of $2.3 million (by October 
2017). 
Total 10 projects with IBRD net 
commitments of $100.5 million, 
IFC committed portfolio of $50.2 
million, IDA net commitments of 
$2.78 million, MIGA exposure of 
$25.4 million, GEF 2 grants of $6.4 
million (by October 2017). 
Eight IBRD investment operations 
and one guarantee with total 
lending of $2.5 billion (by October 
2017). Since 1992, a Bank’s 
commitments to Ukraine totalled 
$12 billion in about 70 projects and 
programs. 
Source: The World Bank (2017a), (2017b), (2017c) 
 
Although in all three countries the WB has been involved in projects which generally aimed at improving 
conditions for economic development, similarly to the IMF, it has put particular emphasis on reduction of 
corruption in Moldova and especially in Ukraine, dedicating significant attention in the most recent country 
partnership framework 2017-21 with Ukraine to the problems of widespread corruption and state capture, 
calling them “fundamental constraints impeding progress” in addressing the challenges of macroeconomic 
instability, weak private sector productivity and ineffective service delivery (World Bank 2017d: 8). In addition to 
the dialogue with government officials, the WB staff has been actively engaged in discussions with private sector 
representatives, think tanks, societal groups and other international institutions and donors, for example, seeing 
the Ukraine’s Association Agreement (AA) with the EU as providing an anchor for country’s reform program.   
 
The following comparative analysis will discuss concrete strategies of the IMF and the WB agreed with Belarus, 
Moldova and Ukraine as well as the record of their implementation. This will provide more concrete examples of 
the objectives, instruments and resources applied in country arrangements, allowing one to draw comparative 
insights on how they differed depending on the country, policy area or sector, and especially how they evolved 
over time. 
 
3.1. IFIs and Belarus 
 
After a period of relatively little cooperation with the IFIs on behalf of Belarus authorities, interest in cooperation 
with the IMF was revived when the country’s ruling elites turned to it for support in the face of external shocks 
in 2008. The SBA of 15 months between the IMF and Belarus was agreed in early 2009, providing access to SDR 
1.618 million ($2.46 billion or 419 % of quota). It aimed at “addressing Belarus’ most pressing vulnerabilities by 
agreeing large upfront financing, strong macroeconomic policy adjustment (devaluation, new exchange rate 
regime, tight fiscal policy), and focused structural reforms” (IMF 2011a: 2).  
 
In terms of sectors, the policy measures mostly aimed at financial and monetary benchmarks, with some effects 
on trade through adjustment of the exchange rate regime and internal structural reforms such as reducing price 
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controls and state ownership. It should be noted, that part of the external shock was related to the increase in 
the prices of energy resources (natural gas and oil) imported from Russia from 2007 to 2008 due to reduced 
export subsidies compounded soon by the effects of global financial crisis. The IMF closely cooperated with the 
WB in the area of structural reforms with the latter, providing a Development Policy Loan in 2009 and technical 
expertise aimed at similar policy priorities (privatization, price flexibility, tax reduction). The IMF staff underlined 
the importance of coordination with the Bank as it “did not have the resources or expertise to address all 
important issues” (IMF 2011a: 19).  
 
However, the WB support for setting up the National Agency for Privatization and Investment and preparing the 
pilot cases of state-owned enterprises to be privatized has not led to any significant privatization deals. More 
progress was achieved in improving the business environment in Belarus, which allowed it to move upwards 
significantly in the ‘Doing Business’ ranking and facilitated the conditions for the creation of private companies, 
often small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), alongside the state owned economy. More recently, the WB 
provided technical assistance in the areas of price liberalization, labour market relations, fiscal planning, deposit 
insurance and bank resolution framework as well as loans for the energy efficiency, water supply and sanitation, 
waste management, transport, education and health care projects (World Bank 2017a).   
 
The IMF saw the SBA as setting the stage for further reforms over the medium-term under a successor program, 
although it was ultimately judged as having ‘mixed’ impact. While some of the most pressing issues, for example, 
in the financial sector, were addressed by the country’s authorities, key identified reforms such as privatization 
and direct lending “were missed or delayed” (IMF 2011a: 2). The staff of the Fund noted the lack of ownership 
of the program at the highest level in Belarus, which could account for the fact that “key identified reforms” were 
not implemented (Ibid.). Lending under government programs (soft budgetary constraints), that was based on 
political decisions (presidential decrees or resolutions of the Council of Ministers), continued to support 
particular projects, sectors and companies in Belarus. There was also a notable lack of progress in privatization, 
such as the sale of state-owned enterprises or opening up of the economy to foreign direct investment. These 
entrenched practices point to the dominance of the ruling elite’s political motives to fund projects that seem 
attractive to the electorate or benefit well-connected interest groups within the power circle surrounding 
President Alexander Lukashenko.  
 
Although reportedly both the IMF and the Belarusian authorities showed flexibility in their approach to 
implementing the SBA (Dobrinsky 2016), in 2010 as the presidential elections were approaching in Belarus, the 
willingness of its authorities to continue cooperation with the IFIs decreased. In 2011, it applied for external 
support from the Eurasian Fund for Stabilisation and Development (EFSD), the conditionality of which was more 
easily adjusted to political motives and more in line with domestic political objectives of Belarus authorities. This 
type of strategic bargaining in the background of the state dominated Belarusian economy, centralization and 
administrative controls suggests that for a number of years, the ruling elites of the country were able to 
manoeuvre between different sources of external funding in order to try to limit overall exposure and maintain 
domestic control of recourses. In addition to Russia-dominated Eurasian financial institutions, these different 
sources of external funding also included China. 
 
More recently, in 2012, faced with another currency crisis, Belarus sold the Belarusian gas pipeline company to 
Gazprom. Rather than acting on the advice of the IMF to privatize small state-owned enterprises to improve 
 Strategies and Approaches of International Financial Institutions towards Eastern Partnership Countries| 19 
 
efficiency of the economy by allowing the development of private sector, the country’s authorities preferred to 
opt for ‘big ticket’ privatizations. Around 2015, Belarusian authorities expressed their interest in developing the 
roadmap of structural reforms with the WB and started talks with the IMF about a new support program of $3 
billion and unlocking the EU macroeconomic assistance linked to it (Ibid.). The talks regarding the accession into 
the WTO were also intensified, although Belarus remained reluctant to open up its agricultural sector and reduce 
government distortions in the economy, shielding its state-owned enterprises from competitive pressures and 
preserving employment despite loss making activities.  
 
However, after initial talks with the Western IFIs, Belarus again turned eastwards. Eventually, in addition to the 
new energy pricing agreement with Russia and renewed funding from the EFSD of a $2 billion for the period 2016 
to 2018, Belarus issued $1.4 billion Eurobonds in 2017. Meanwhile, the IMF adopted a stricter tone, asking for 
authorities to show clear high-level commitment to structural reforms. This came after the regular Article IV 
mission was concluded in November 2017, criticizing Belarus for pervasive distortions in resource allocation by 
the state and urging “deeper and faster institutional and structural reforms” (IMF 2017a).   
 
The element which differentiates Belarus from other EaP countries discussed here and which is relevant to 
understanding the relatively limited role of IFIs and their conditionality, is its close integration with Russia, or, as 
some analysts described it, its “maintaining an economic lifeline to Moscow” (Wesslau and Wilson 2017: 1). In 
terms of foreign trade and as a source of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), Russia is the most important economic 
partner for Belarus. It has also traditionally provided Belarusian authorities with “loyalty rents” via subsidized 
prices of natural gas and oil sold to Belarus, important also for its oil processing and chemical industry, in 
exchange for political alliance. Belarusian-Russian bilateral cooperation could be regarded as a case of a co-
existence of dominant ruling coalitions, which have a mutual interest in preservation of others’ dominance within 
their own political domains. Notwithstanding disagreements with Russia linked to trade within the Eurasian 
Customs Union or treatment of political issues such as annexation of Crimea, the Belarusian authorities so far 
managed to balance benefits resulting from the interdependence with Russia and preservation of domestic 
autonomy from too much outside interference. The key question, though, is how much longer Belarusian 
authorities will be able to play this balancing game, as some warn that ‘Minsk’s cards are weakening’ vis-à-vis 
Moscow due to the growing asymmetries of interdependence reflected in much smaller concessions given by 
Russia in 2016-17 deals on energy pricing and financial support compared to 2010-11 (Moshes and Nizhnikau 
2017).  
 
3.2. IFIs and Moldova 
 
Moldova’s relationship with the IFIs has been relatively intense throughout most of the period since 1993, but 
its effect in terms of actual policy reforms and economic development is rather limited. In 2009, the government 
formed by a coalition of parties, which declared their intention to accelerate integration with the EU by calling 
their coalition ‘The Alliance for European Integration’. This coalition stated its determination to implement 
reforms that had been recommended by the IFIs and to coordinate this process with the negotiations of the EU 
AA. Many AA related reforms such as trade liberalization, rule of law, business environment and public sector 
reforms were in line with policies recommended by the IFIs and other donor organizations such as the United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID).  
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The government requested IMF combined Extended Credit Facility/Extended Fund Facility Arrangements each 
running for three years, with access totalling SDR 369.6 million (300 % of quota or $588 million) split equally 
between two facilities (IMF 2010). The other partners – the European Commission, the WB, the EIB, the EBRD – 
were expected to provide the same amount as the IMF to cover all borrowing needs. The program was based on 
four pillars:  
“fiscal policies to restore sustainability while safeguarding public investment and social spending 
priorities; flexible monetary and exchange rate policies to keep inflation under control, facilitate 
adjustment to shocks, and rebuild foreign reserves; policies to ensure financial stability by early 
detection of bank difficulties and strengthening the legal framework for bank rehabilitation and 
resolution; and structural reforms to raise the economy’s potential” (IMF 2010: 1).  
 
In describing the economic policy in Moldova at the time, the IMF staff noted that “the economy remained 
overregulated and hampered by relative price distortions” (IMF 2010: 4), advising that Moldova undertake over 
the whole program period “a massive program of deregulation and liberalization” to free business initiative, 
stimulate competition, and strongly support economic recovery (IMF 2010: 7). Several reviews of the program in 
2011 and 2012 repeatedly called for critical structural reforms. The forth review stated that the program was 
“broadly on track”, all performance criteria were met except for the ceiling on the general government deficit 
(IMF 2012a). The fifth review noted that with the stabilization of the political situation after the presidential 
elections in 2012 and the next parliamentary elections scheduled for only 2015, there was “a window of 
opportunity for implementing much-needed structural reforms”, also noting that “economic policies remained 
susceptible to pressures from special interest groups, as demonstrated by recent slippages” (IMF 2012b: 4-5). As 
would become clear two years later when the banking fraud was publicized, the actual risks were significant. 
 
Around 2010, this enthusiasm and support for reforms expressed by the EU, US, IFIs and other donors was also 
strengthened by domestic politics in Moldova. At this time, a majority of the population was supportive of EU 
integration and the country’s government expressed willingness to proceed with reforms without insisting on 
the EU’s promise of membership perspective (as seemed to be the case with the Ukrainian official position at the 
time, although the latter was the first to start AA talks). Although on the political and legislative levels the 
progress was noticeable, the Moldovan authorities did not opt for a unilateral liberalization of the economy and 
deregulation reforms aimed at reducing incentives for corruption, as was undertaken by Georgia. 
 
For several years up until 2014, Moldova was advancing in terms of European integration and enacted some 
domestic reforms to start implementing the AA, including trade liberalization with the EU, and a visa-free regime. 
However, the banking fraud of around $1 billion (the sum totalling approximately 10 per cent of Moldova’s GDP) 
revealed in late 2014 damaged the trust of Western actors in the ruling elites of the country and their 
determination to reform. The crisis caused economic recession in the country and affected the political situation 
in Moldova with five changes in government in less than four years. Since 2016, the centre-right government has 
co-existed with a socialist president, who was elected later that year campaigning on a slogan of terminating the 
AA with the EU and joining the Eurasian Union, with its society divided and sceptical of further reforms. Three 
banks representing one-third of the system were closed in October 2015. 
 
At the request of the country’s authorities, the IMF stepped in with a three-year Extended Credit Facility (ECF) 
and Extended Fund Facility (EFF) of $183 million (SDR 129.1 million) at the end of 2016 to support the efforts of 
 Strategies and Approaches of International Financial Institutions towards Eastern Partnership Countries| 21 
 
country’s institutions to manage the crisis by stabilizing the banking sector, assisting in restoring macroeconomic 
and financial stability. In addition to the above mentioned objectives, the program also focused on improving 
governance and business climate, attracting foreign and domestic investment, supporting economic 
diversification, and enacting targeted labour market reforms. The implementation of the program was also linked 
to unlocking other external support from multilateral and bilateral donors amounting to total $825 million over 
the three-year program period, based on semi-annual program reviews assessing agreed performance criteria, 
indicative targets and structural benchmarks. The program was expected to catalyse budget support from the 
WB of about $45 million in 2016 (with subsequent smaller operations from 2017 to 2019), macro-financial 
assistance from the EU of €97.4 million over the period 2017 to 2018 (of which €40 million in grants and €57.4 
million in concessional loans), budget sectoral grants from the EU at about €94 million over the period 2017 to 
2018, and bilateral budget support from Romania at about €150 million (IMF 2016a).   
 
As the IMF staff concluded during the second review of the program, by late 2017 Moldova made important 
progress in cleaning the financial sector, though with delay, including strengthening supervisory and regulatory 
frameworks, increasing management and ownership transparency. However, it was stressed that further work 
was needed in reforming the banking sector, addressing weak governance, corruption and infrastructure gaps, 
strengthening effectiveness of monetary policy, transparency and cost recovery in the energy sector, tackling the 
shadow economy and relatively low development of human capital (IMF 2017b). It should be noted that with 
respect to energy sector reforms, the IMF has been cooperating with the WB, the Energy Community and other 
stakeholders. Cooperation with the WB has also been important in addressing labour market issues, in particular 
the mismatch between skills supply and demand, incentives for legal employment and job creation in the country 
(reducing incentives to emigrate). 
 
In addition to structural reforms and regulatory changes, dealing with corruption has been one of the key 
priorities of the IMF. One of the terms used in characterizing reforms was the caution that reform progress is not 
yet “irreversible” (Ibid.). The IMF also maintained that continued progress on banking sector reforms hinged “on 
sustained political commitment to strengthen the sector and tackle vested interests”, which as well as general 
program implementation could be tested in the run-up to the parliamentary elections at the end of 2018 (Ibid.). 
However, the staff supported completing the second review by disbursing SDR 15.7 million, bringing the total 
sum disbursed to SDR 57.4 million. It also reset six structural benchmarks in the financial sector which “posed 
political and technical challenges” for later dates “aligning them with the authorities’ implementation capacities” 
(IMF 2017b: 22). In June 2018, after conducting the third review of the ECF and EFF, the IMF noted “significant 
progress” in cleaning up the financial sector and underlining that it was “critical that prudent policies are 
maintained and reforms continue to advance to complete the repair of the financial sector, ensure transparency 
and stability in the energy sector, and maintain macroeconomic stability, […] to further improve governance” 
making available SDR 24 million (IMF 2018b). The IMF has been coordinating its financial support with the EC 
macro-financial assistance and bilateral donors (i.e. Romania). 
 
Since Moldova joined the WB in 1992, it has benefited from around 60 projects in the country worth 
approximately $1 billion in areas such as regulatory reform, improving business environment, modernizing 
government services, tax administration, education, health care, roads, agriculture, energy and environment. 
The WB Country Partnership Framework for the period 2018 to 2021 focuses on three areas: strengthening 
economic governance, in particular the rule of law and accountability in economic institutions, improving 
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inclusive access to, the efficiency and the quality of public services, and enhancing the quality and relevance of 
education and training for job-relevant skills. One of the examples of the WB support is Education Reform Project 
of $40 million started in 2013 directed at improving the quality, relevance and efficiency of the education system, 
for example, the gap between the skills demanded by the labour market and the supply of education institutions. 
The latest disbursement of $10 million to be used for training, purchase of equipment and upgrading of 
laboratories was approved in February 2018 (Vlas 2018).  
 
To sum up, although in 2010 there seemed to be a window of opportunity due to popular support and political 
consensus regarding economic and institutional reforms, the latter has been primarily limited to what was 
directly politically important for signing the AA and progressing with visa liberalization. Although external actors 
coordinated their support for Moldova and applied conditionality, it has not created strong enough incentives 
for irreversible reforms to open up the economy and to make the regulation of key sectors transparent, the 
judicial sector independent and governance efficient. As the banking fraud revealed in late 2014, the areas of 
business environment, regulatory policies, corruption prevention and judicial system remained unreformed (or 
reformed only ‘on paper’). With the background of the economic recession in 2015 and financial risks, the fragile 
political agreement to accept IFIs and EU conditional support resulted in some further progress. But the prospect 
of reforms remains very uncertain due to popular reform fatigue and the competing vision of Eurasian integration 
which, if it gains support during the elections, could redirect political attention from agreed reforms, reduce the 
need for IFIs assistance and halt the already slow process of transition reforms.    
 
3.3. IFIs and Ukraine 
 
Ukraine’s relations with the IMF and the WB have also been characterized by numerous partly implemented 
agreements and repetition of suspended assistance. Even with the background of the financial crisis in 1998, the 
Ukrainian authorities have shown reluctance to implement reform commitments in restructuring the country’s 
economy, especially energy and agricultural sectors, improving business environment, and consolidating public 
finances. This prompted the IMF representative to publicly threaten to put on hold the transfer of the third 
tranche of a three-year program worth $2.2 billion (the first two tranches of $335 million were delivered) and 
automatically putting on hold the WB loans of $950 million (Gorchinskaya 1998). Therefore, the IMF staff has 
characterized the overall record of Ukraine’s program compliance until recent years as “weak” (IMF 2005: 11).  
 
It should be noted that in the late 1990s, the relations between the IMF and the Ukrainian government cooled 
down after practices of misreporting reserve assets by the country’s authorities were publicized, although the 
Fund staff later acknowledged its own role in allowing the misreporting because of its willingness to work under 
rushed and disorganized circumstances and a climate of forbearance to “make the programs work” (IMF 2005: 
12). Self-critical assessments by the Fund also related to certain conditions in its non-core areas and proliferation 
of structural measures and sub-measures used to monitor implementation throughout 1990s, which later led to 
the streamlining of structural conditionality. On the other hand, the IMF staff argued that the Fund served three 
valuable functions in Ukraine: transferring knowledge, coordinating policies, and advising on policy initiatives, 
and that the Fund “may have faced a trade-off between running the risk of repeated program disappointments 
and exercising these valuable functions” (IMF 2005: 31). The IMF and the WB worked in a coordinated manner 
with overlapping conditionality used for key reforms and drawing on each other’s expertise. 
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Ukraine provides an interesting case, with two windows of opportunity for potential reforms that opened as a 
result of political upheaval and popular discontent with the muddling-through of nomeklatura and entrenched 
oligarchic regime during a period of ten years since 2004. The ‘Orange Revolution’ of 2004 proved to be a 
disappointment for those who expected a radical break with the dominance of corrupt and rent-accumulating 
behaviour of ruling elites. The Ukrainian government soon returned to the usual pattern of policy-making, which 
has been characterized by some analysts as “a history of its inability to commit to reforms”, its relationship with 
the IMF described as a “tradition of failed IMF programs” (Vox Ukraine 2016).  
 
The incremental and piecemeal nature of reforms, falling short of recommended benchmarks and agreed policy 
indicators, has been regularly noted by the IMF staff in the country reports. For example, in 2005, the IMF staff 
pointed to the lack of fiscal restraint and financial sectors’ vulnerabilities, “a generally difficult investment 
climate”, resulting from complex regulations as well as bureaucratic discretion and corruption (IMF 2005: 4). 
They further noted that the Ukraine-EU action plan could provide a blueprint for structural reforms, stressing the 
need to tighten monetary policy, and the need for more market-friendly institutions, also underlining the lack of 
consistency and political consensus on required reforms as “a key bottleneck” (Ibid.). On the impact of IMF 
technical assistance to the Ukrainian authorities, it was noted that the recent policy dialogue seemed “to have 
fostered internal debate and reflection, even when the authorities and staff disagreed” (IMF 2005: 7). Looking 
back into the long-term IMF engagement with Ukraine since the early 1990s, it was concluded that “Fund-
supported programs had a mixed record in achieving their objectives. While the programs were quite effective 
in supporting macroeconomic stability, they did not succeed in accelerating the build-up of more market-friendly 
institutions”. The general assessment was that “Ukraine’s disappointing transition experience” could be 
attributed “mainly to a lack of political consensus, particularly on building more market-friendly institutions (IMF 
2005: 32). It was followed with a recommendation to prioritize tackling long-delayed institutional reforms which 
should be rooted in political consensus and better program ownership.  
 
Similar policy recommendations were provided by the WB in relation to the projects it has funded in Ukraine. 
For example, in the 2003, the major focus of the Country Assistance Strategy for Ukraine for the years 2004-07 
was to support the “European choice” agenda of Ukraine, in particular “further institutional reform that would 
lead to a business-friendly environment and a more inclusive and responsive government” (IMF 2005: 53). It 
recommended working on Ukraine’s European agenda both from the top, through reform of institutions and 
policies, and from the bottom, through strengthening civil society. The WB strategy proposed $2.4 billion base 
case lending program, allowing for a more ambitious high case of $3 billion maximum. Its distinct feature was its 
results orientation – the amount and content of financial assistance was conditional upon the ability of the 
Ukrainian government to accomplish the relevant benchmarks. In terms of sectoral coverage, the WB projects 
focused on improving public governance by targeting support to investment climate, public administration and 
public finance management and social inclusion. Concrete examples of funded projects included the 
modernization of tax administration and statistics, the establishment of the land registry in rural areas, improving 
the efficiency of the energy sector, water and waste management, the development of community-based social 
services for vulnerable groups as well as the development of civil society and economic research. 
 
As mentioned above, the ‘Orange revolution’ and political changes in 2004, which brought to power President 
Yushchenko on a reform platform that promised to tackle pervasive corruption and rent-seeking, did not result 
in major reforms. Although the economy’s growth accelerated, partly due to global economic developments, 
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partly due to high expectations linked to domestic reforms, the policy continued to represent a mix of 
incremental and partial measures. Moreover, the political instability, with frequent changes in the composition 
of the government, narrow majorities, tensions between the president and prime minister and the presence of 
powerful vested interest groups continued. In their 2006 report, the IMF staff pointed to financial sector 
vulnerabilities and such unresolved issues as “insecure property rights, corruption and regulatory jungle”, also 
noting that implementation of Fund staff policy advice, in particular on structural issues, was “slow and uneven”, 
reflecting “an ingrained preference for gradualism and a polarized body politic that has found it difficult to reach 
and sustain consensus on implementing market-friendly policies” (IMF 2007b). Some advances were noted in 
levelling the playing field for business and liberalizing trade, primarily through a reduction in the level of import 
duties, while reforms in the energy sector, tax administration and public procurement were characterized as 
stalled or even backtracked.  
 
In 2008, as the signs of overheating and substantial vulnerabilities were noted, the same traditional policy 
concerns were expressed by the IMF staff: uneven progress on macroeconomic and structural reform, in large 
part reflecting protracted political uncertainties with new “Orange” coalition government coming into power in 
late 2007 and presidential elections scheduled in a couple of years (IMF 2008). The key areas requiring attention 
included: improving the business climate by updating and strengthening the legal framework; improving 
accounting standards and establishing a market for agricultural land; continuing to liberalize trade policy, 
including by abandoning export restrictions (WTO accession was noted as a significant achievement in this 
regard); improving energy efficiency, including by allowing all domestic prices to reflect full costs; and 
strengthening tax administration (Ibid.).  
 
Although in late 2008 the IMF approved another SBA for Ukraine to assist the country in dealing with a negative 
external environment and a domestic crisis of confidence, Ukraine was one of the countries hit hardest by the 
Great Recession – its reform record continued to be mixed. As the ex post assessment of the program stated 
several years later, “program implementation was difficult against the backdrop of sharp political divisions and 
weak institutional capacity”, only two of the envisaged eight reviews were completed, and the program “went 
off track in Autumn 2009 as commitment vanished ahead of the January 2010 presidential elections” (IMF 2011b: 
3). It was concluded that short-term objectives were largely met – the banking system stabilized, the current 
account adjusted quickly, social areas and sovereign default avoided, economic recovery gradually started. 
However, little progress towards meeting medium-term was noted – no major shift in policy making occurred, 
efforts to tackle the underlying structural and institutional weakness stalled, bank resolution remained 
incomplete, the energy sector unreformed with quasi-fiscal deficits widening, public finances strained, and legal 
and governance reforms falling short of objectives (Ibid.). In a sober assessment, the Fund’s staff observed that 
the key lesson was once again “the importance of ownership and governance, but there were no clear-cut 
answers on how to achieve this in Ukraine. Four signatories of the program, many prior actions, and close IMF 
involvement – including through significant technical assistance – were only partially successful. Less front-
loading of the program may have provided a stronger incentive to follow through with policies but would have 
to be balanced against the need to secure confidence and adequate financing” (Ibid.).   
 
In 2010, Ukraine again agreed a new 29-month SBA of $15.4 billion with the IMF, with an immediate first tranche 
of $1.89 billion, after agreeing to adopt fiscal tightening measures and increasing household natural gas prices. 
The Ukrainian authorities reportedly first tried to raise money on international financial markets but cancelled a 
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$2 billion Eurobond issue faced with the prospect of having to pay more than an eight per cent interest rate 
(Olearchyk 2010). However, the second review on the SBA was put on hold in early 2011 as authorities once 
again backtracked on their commitments to raise gas and heating tariffs in 2011 and on reforms in some other 
areas including tax administration, resolution of banks and exceeding initially agreed government deficit target 
(IMF 2012c). As a result, the WB and European Commission support was also put on hold. In 2012, the IMF staff 
repeated traditional advice on the need for immediate steps in fiscal consolidation, deep structural reforms, in 
particular in the energy and banking sectors, improving the business environment and weak governance (Ibid.). 
After the SBA with the IMF expired in late 2012, in early 2013 Ukraine raised $ 2.25 billion in two Eurobond issues 
at yields of about 7.5 per cent. However, soon afterwards the yields increased to a 8.5-15 per cent range, making 
it too expensive for the country’s authorities to borrow, resulting in decreasing NBU’s international reserves and 
leading to downgrading of the country’s ratings.   
 
Later, during the October 2013 Article IV consultations, the IMF staff reiterated again “that incomplete transition 
to market economy held back Ukraine’s economy”, referring to “a large state budget, distorting price 
competition, and pervasive governance deficiencies”, that “inconsistent macroeconomic policies generated 
deep-seated vulnerabilities and recurrent crises”, finally, that “political polarization, the upcoming presidential 
elections, and pressures from vested interests limited authorities’ policy space” (IMF 2014b). In December 2013, 
after President Yanukovich declined to sign an AA with the EU at the Vilnius EaP summit in November 2013, 
Ukraine received a $15 billion loan from Russia. However, a couple of months later, after the escape of President 
Yanukovich, and with the unlikely prospect that the remaining $12 billion would be received from Russia, 
Ukraine’s authorities appealed to Western donors for financial support.  
 
The Maidan events in 2014 and resulting political changes in the ruling coalition yet again opened up a window 
of opportunity for economic and institutional reforms, which have long been recommended by the IFIs but not 
implemented. The country was close to default and after its authorities again requested IMF support, setting out 
planned economic and financial policy reforms, a new SAB of $17 billion was approved in April 2014. The program 
aimed at restoring external solvency, replenishing international reserves, improving governance and laying 
foundations for sustainable growth by restoring sound public finances, as well as rationalizing the energy sector 
and improving the business environment (IMF 2014c). It should be noted that before signing the agreement, the 
IMF staff, in addition to meeting official representatives of the key institutions – the Acting President, Prime 
Minister, Governor of the NBU, Minister of Finance, Minister of Economy, Minister of Energy, Minister of Labour 
and Social Policies, other officials, ambassadors, trade unions, banking and business community, also held 
discussions with three leading presidential candidates, the Maidan Council and other activists.  
 
However, less than half a year later, during the first review, the IMF stated that the key risks of geopolitical 
conflict and escalation of the dispute with Gazprom had materialized in a deepening economic crisis and 
complicated compliance with agreed target indicators (IMF 2014d). The staff supported the request of Ukraine’s 
authorities for completion of the first review and the waivers for non-observance and applicability of 
performance criteria, at the same time highlighting the risks if the conflict did not subside as assumed. In March 
2015, after the Ukrainian authorities decided to cancel the SBA concluded in previous year, the IMF Executive 
board approved a four year $ 17.5 billion Extended Fund Facility (EFF) under Fund’s exceptional access policy, 
allowing to immediately disburse $5 billion (with $2.7 billion allocated for budgetary support) (IMF 2015a). The 
stated aims of the program have again included restoring external sustainability, strengthening public finances, 
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and supporting economic growth by advancing structural and governance reforms, while protecting the most 
vulnerable. While once again acknowledging the exceptional risks arising from the conflict in Eastern Ukraine, 
which could affect the country’s ability to sustain stabilization efforts and deliver structural overhaul, the IMF 
noted that the crisis provided “an opportunity for the government to make a decisive break from the past and 
implement reform-oriented and sustainable policies with strong ownership” (Ibid.).  
 
After the first review in mid-2015, IMF staff acknowledged “a strong start in implementing the program” and 
recommended the completion of it, urging further fiscal consolidation and energy sector reform as well as 
substantial progress with structural reforms, in particular stepping up efforts to fight corruption, improve the 
business climate, and reform state-owned enterprises (IMF 2015b). The second review of Ukraine’s economic 
program supported by the EFF arrangement acknowledged that authorities “have continued to make progress 
in implementing the program”, including sizable fiscal adjustment, the increase in gas and heating tariffs to full 
cost recovery and decisive steps in rehabilitating the banking system, and recommended the disbursement of 
another $1 billion bringing total disbursements to $7.62 billion, at the same time approving waivers for non-
observance of performance criteria related to net international reserves, non-accumulation of external payments 
arrears and non-introduction of new exchange restrictions (IMF 2016b). Again, the main policy recommendations 
included further progress in fiscal reform, in particular improving tax and customs administration as well as 
pension reform, strengthening the banking system, completing structural reforms, “where much remains to be 
done, including combating corruption and improving governance”, especially equal application of the rule of law, 
restructuring and divestiture of state-owned enterprises, and prosecuting high-level corruption cases (Ibid.).   
 
The third review of Ukraine’s EFF resulted in the IMF approving another, fourth tranche of $1 billion 
disbursement in April 2017. However, it was four months late and the balance between acknowledgement of the 
country authorities’ reform achievements and the remaining tasks had shifted towards a more critical 
assessment of the former. It was stated that “progress in advancing structural reforms had been mixed” (IMF 
2017c). Acknowledging important achievements in the energy and financial sectors, the IMF staff underlined 
limited progress in reforming and privatizing state-owned enterprises, land and pension reforms, and effectively 
tackling corruption. It also noted that in coming years “the strength and durability of the recovery depended 
critically upon the pace and depth of structural reforms”, especially improving the business environment and 
attracting investments, increasing productivity and labour market participation (Ibid.).  
 
The resolve of the Ukrainian authorities to proceed with reforms suggested by the IFIs declined around mid-
2017. Despite the reassurances of Ukrainian government officials that the country would get one more IMF 
tranche in 2017, it did not happen (Rao and Strohecker 2017). The deadline for the next tranche in summer 2017 
was missed, and in 2018 the IMF continued to delay the next disbursement. In late 2017, the criticism toward 
the Ukrainian authorities’ lack of progress in dealing with corruption and other outstanding reforms was stepped 
up by public criticisms from IMF Managing Director Christine Lagarde, as well as the US and EU authorities urging 
Ukrainian institutions to safeguard the independence of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) and the 
special anti-corruption prosecutors’ office, and to pass legislation creating an independent anti-corruption court 
(Verbyany 2017).  
 
In 2018, the IMF continued prioritizing anti-corruption measures, with Managing Director Christine Lagarde 
commenting, after a talk with President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko on June 19, that she was “very encouraged 
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by the adoption of the law on the High Anti-Corruption Court by the Ukrainian parliament” (IMF 2018c). This 
evolution paved the way for setting up the Court, although it was still dependent on supplementary law being 
submitted by the president, adopted by the country’s parliament, and implemented (Ibid.). Lagarde also 
repeated that actions related to gas prices and the budget were critical to allow the completion of the pending 
review of Ukraine’s IMF-supported program (Ibid.).  
 
In October 2018, the Ukrainian authorities and the IMF staff reached agreement on a new 14-month SBA with 
requested access of SDR 2.8 billion (equal to $ 3.9 billion) prepared in coordination with the WB and the EU (IMF 
2018d). It replaced the 2015 agreements with the IMF, which were due to end in March 2019. Its focus remained 
the same, oriented towards fiscal consolidation, tax administration, the financial sector and energy sector 
reforms, including governance issues such as independence of the central bank, financial management, 
operationalizing the anti-corruption court, privatizing large state-owned enterprises, streamlining regulations 
and advancing land reform. Its approval by the IMF Executive Board was made conditional upon adoption by the 
Ukrainian parliament of the country’s budget for 2019 consistent with IMF staff recommendations, including an 
increase in household gas and heating tariffs. On December 18, 2018, the IMF Executive Board approved the 
memorandum after agreed decisions were taken by the Ukrainian parliament, and released the first tranche of 
SDR 1 billion ($ 1.4 billion), opening the way for the country to attract other international financial support, 
including $ 750 million of loan guarantees from the WB (IMF 2018e). Once again, the IMF warned about 
significant domestic and external risks to the implementation of the agreement. 
 
To sum up, analysts acknowledge that substantial reforms have been undertaken in the last several years by 
Ukrainian authorities, including: banking sector reform and reform of its regulatory institution (NBU); exchange 
rate regime and inflation targeting changes; fiscal reform and debt restructuring; gas sector reform; public 
procurement (ProZorro) reform; some changes in business environment, health care and education areas; and 
policy reform (Ash 2018; Vox Ukraine 2017). It has been argued that, compared to the attempts at implementing 
reform after ‘the Orange Revolution’, the round of reforms since 2014 has been more successful (Dabrowski 
2017).  
 
However, since the third review of the program in April 2017, progress in advancing energy pricing by removing 
remaining loopholes, in land reform, and in anti-corruption measures, such as the creation of an independent 
anti-corruption court, has been lacking or only partially adopted, and with extensive delays. This has included a 
significant delay in appointing the NBU governor. After some attempts by the Ukrainian authorities to borrow at 
very high yields, thus risking default, in the second half of 2018 they decided to move ahead with reforms. This 
was due to the approaching repayments of debts in the coming years and the IMF remaining the main source of 
external funding. Only four tranches totalling $8.7 billion were received within the four-year program, instead of 
the initially agreed twelve tranches, due to delays in implementing reform commitments (Shevchenko 2018). 
This led to the agreement of a new SBA with the IMF in late 2018 and the disbursement of its first tranche in 
December 2018. This latest agreement with the IMF allows sufficient international financing to maintain 
macroeconomic stability by meeting Ukraine’s balance-of-payments needs and maintains currency reserves until 
the end of 2019. Importantly, it is expected to send a positive signal to financial markets, facilitating sales of 
government bonds to meet earlier borrowing commitments (Aslund 2018). It should also anchor fiscal policies 
and structural reforms to strengthen investors’ confidence and unlock funding from other international donors, 
with the EU and WB providing an additional $2 billion (Ibid.). However, with the election campaign gaining speed 
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and some of the presidential candidates promising to undo politically controversial measures undertaken as prior 
actions under this agreement, for example, adjusting gas and heating prices, the year 2019 is likely to become 





The IMF and the WB interact on different levels with relevant institutions and actors in recipient countries. Policy 
assessment and advice is provided by region and country staff members from IFIs, who meet regularly with 
representatives of countries’ governments, central banks, other official institutions, also analysts, business and 
trade union representatives, NGOs and other societal actors to get information on and assessments of a country’s 
policies. Sometimes experts from both the IMF and the WB negotiate together in a trilateral format with recipient 
country representatives. There are also high-level meetings among the top officials of the IMF and the WB with 
countries’ presidents and prime ministers. The IMF and the WB generally follow the practices of international 
economic cooperation and multilateralism, at the same time supporting country reforms which reduce barriers 
to international exchange and economic development, in particular with a focus on governance reforms aimed 
at reducing corruption and rent-accumulation.  
 
They also coordinate their activities in the recipient countries with other institutions and donors. In the EaP 
countries, they coordinate closely with the EU institutions in their provision of policy advice and technical 
assistance in capacity building for the independent non-majoritarian institutions such as competition authorities 
or central banks. For example, in Moldova the WB and the IMF experts coordinated their support measures with 
the EU institutions in providing technical support for the National Agency for the Protection of Competition 
(Freyburg et al. 2015: 92). The two year SBA concluded by the IMF with Ukrainian authorities in April 2014, for a 
total international financial support of $33 billion over two years, was coordinated with the World Bank as well 
as the EU, EBRD, EIB and bilateral donors, with the IMF committing $17 billion of credits (Aslund 2015: 53). In 
addition, EU macro-financial assistance of $1 billion in loans, though reportedly more flexible than the IMF’s in 
terms of the use of conditionality, was linked to the signature of the agreement between the IMF and Ukraine 
(Youngs 2017: 125). The role of IFIs extends beyond their direct support in a sense that their decisions can be 
treated as anchors that affect the decisions of other institutional donors or financial markets. The efforts at 
coordination with the EU and its member states, however, are sometimes constrained by divergent priorities of 
particular EU member states that focus on particular sectors, like energy or agriculture, and political incentives 
to report about successes of bilateral assistance back home. 
 
Conditionality in itself could become an important instrument for use by reform-minded actors within recipient 
countries to change the equilibrium of domestic (lack of) support for proposed reforms. Although the need to 
engage local reform-minded elites and to create a sense of “local ownership” of reform programs has been 
noted, it has also been argued that too much external pressure can be ineffective or even counterproductive 
(Williamson and Haggard 1994: 566). The prospect of support from IFIs can also be used as leverage by ruling 
elites to extract resources or concessions from other external actors in an economic and political relationship. 
For example, when Belarus authorities were considering the option of IMF support in 2015, Belarusian President 
Lukashenko, after first hosting the head of the IMF mission, later in his visit to New York, met with the IMF 
Managing Director Lagarde to signal the importance of a possible agreement (Belta 2015). However, eventually 
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Belarus turned to support from Russia and Eurasian Union institutions. About a year later, in 2016, President 
Lukashenko publicly criticized the measures proposed by the IMF, such as raising utility rates, privatizing state-
owned enterprises and other “super liberal” requirements that could “choke the nation” and “erase everything 
the nation and the president have done in the last 20 years” (Belta 2016). He furthermore claimed that it was 
the US and the EU as dominant shareholders who decided the policies of the IMF and that “no IMF decisions 
have ever been made without them” (Ibid.).  
 
The experience of the IMF and the WB with Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine has contributed to additional efforts 
at increasing the ownership of the country agreements and policy reforms agreed. To maximize program 
ownership, the program could be signed jointly by four signatories: the country’s president, prime minister, 
minister of finance and the governor of the central bank (a unique feature applied in the case of the SBA of 2008 
with Ukraine). The program can also be presented to the political opposition to broaden political support for its 
implementation (this has been practiced in Ukraine – see IMF 2011b). In coordination with the IMF, the 
authorities of the recipient country usually provide assessments of the country’s situation, which are then 
submitted alongside staff reports from the IFIs. While the IFIs interact with ruling elites in recipient countries, 
they also engage with different stakeholders from civil society to collect information on the country’s situation 
and progress in implementing reforms. Although the involvement of NGOs and other societal actors can increase 
bottom-up support for transition reforms, there are also risks to this approach. Dominant coalitions can 
manipulate the process by establishing their own societal organizations, which only formally act as NGOs. 
Furthermore, NGOs can pressure the authorities to undertake reforms with only symbolic value, as could 





The IFIs, in particular the IMF, have played an important role in supporting the transition of EaP countries from 
centrally planned economies to market economies. Although their activities have been aimed specifically at 
macroeconomic and financial stabilization (in the case of the IMF) and economic development (in the case of the 
WB), they nevertheless encompassed a broad reform agenda (see Table 3).  
 
Table 3. Framework for assessing approaches and strategies of IFIs towards EaP countries 
Dimension Categorization  
Sector specific 
Trade Migration Energy Security 
Guiding principles 
Multilateral actors; 
Engagement dependent on 
recipient country request; 
Coordination with other 
donors 
 
    
Goals (general)  
objectives (sectoral) 
 
- policies  
- instruments 
- resources 
Transition to open market 
economy and institutions; 




assistance in exchange for 
reforms) 




























































& targets of external 
actors’ foreign policy 
IFIs’ executive boards of 
directors and staff members; 
Coordination of policies with 
other IFIs, the EU, the US and 
other donors; 
In recipient country – ruling 
elites (President, PM, MoF, 
Central Bank), opposition, 
societal actors, potential ruling 
elites 
    
Source: compiled by the author on the basis of IMF and WB reports 
 
Their strategies and approaches were to a large extent based on the assumption that open economies, including 
a liberal external trade regime and reduced regulatory and other barriers to market entry, are the key condition 
to successful transition and reform of institutions.  
 
It should be noted, however, that fiscal consolidation and reforms of governing structures have dominated 
assistance programs with financial (banking) and energy sectors’ reforms receiving particular attention in all 
three countries. The focus on these two sectors could be seen as an indication of the areas where rent-seeking 
is most widely practiced and/or reforms are often avoided. More specifically, reforms may be avoided by the 
local elite with a vested interest in preserving rent-accumulation sources, often hidden behind a bureaucratic 
‘jungle’, which deprives the majority of the population from opportunities to increase their purchasing power 
and to access public services without personal connections. For example, artificially low prices of gas and heating 
are used to maintain public support for the closed economic and institutional environment, while still allowing 
the ruling elite to maintain privileges. 
 
Meanwhile, external trade liberalization has been addressed mostly indirectly, through support of trade 
liberalization within the WTO accession process, as in the case of Ukraine, and on the basis of the AAs, as in the 
cases of Moldova and Ukraine. Competition and market entry has primarily been supported by focusing on 
levelling the playing field in terms of tax regime, removing privileges of state-owned enterprises, and reducing 
discretion and rent-seeking practices. Particular focus has been laid on reducing incentives for corruption as well 
as enforcing sanctions for corrupt practices, which also aims at making the business environment more attractive 
to foreign investors. Increasing the focus on policies aimed at reducing corruption, in particular in the case of 
Ukraine, is among the most notable features of the IFIs’ operations in those countries. However, such measures 
were most often at risk of only being implemented ‘on paper’, in a symbolic way, i.e. without leading to the 
desired outcome. 
 
The attempts to broaden the political and societal support for the country assistance programs and agreed policy 
reforms have become another exceptional element of the support strategy that has been practiced by the IFIs in 
EaP countries, in particular in Ukraine. In the latter case, the negotiated arrangements were discussed not only 
with key figures from the ruling elites and responsible institutions but also with the opposition, societal activists 
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and other important stakeholders. In this respect, all three country cases are different. In Belarus, societal 
support for transition reforms and the elimination of rent-seeking activities is the weakest, most probably due 
to the preference for relative stability and order as well as satisfactory living conditions provided to a large share 
of population, often employed by the public sector. In Moldova, the initial support from the population for 
reforms around 2010 decreased after the bank fraud revealed how the dominant elites imitated reforms, at the 
same time using them as a cover up for rent-accumulation. In Ukraine, societal support for reforms has been the 
strongest, although it also has its limits when confronted with organizations established and funded by oligarchs 
or when distracted by symbolic reform measures.  
 
The IMF and the WB have practiced a coordinated approach to financial and technical support for transition 
measures in Central and Eastern European countries. They have coordinated their policies among themselves 
and other institutions and donors such as the US, EU, EBRD, EIC and others. The IMF has usually played the role 
of an anchor with respect to unlocking financial support to the recipient countries. Its role, however, has been 
extended far beyond direct financial support and related conditionality. It has been an important provider of 
technical expertise, a coordinator of policy advice, an anchor of reform policies and a signalling institution 
watched by financial markets. At the same time, as the case of Belarus illustrates, the IMF and other external 
actors’ efforts at coordination have also had limited effects because Russia and, to some extent, China pursue 
different goals in those countries in comparison. Belarus’ authorities have been practicing a ‘pick-and-choose’ 
approach to their relations with different sources of external support, relying on those that are softer on 
conditions of funding or less stringent on implementation of the reforms that could threaten the dominant 
position and rent-accumulation channels of the ruling elite.  
 
The gradualism of the Ukrainian and Moldovan transition processes as well as the more limited reforms of 
Belarus illustrate the limits of the IFIs’ strategies in supporting transition. In all three cases, the IMF and the WB 
have focused on similar policy areas using similar instruments and policy conditionalities in line with their 
mandates and the needs expressed by recipient countries’ authorities. The need for funding has been the main 
incentive for the three countries’ authorities to engage with the IFIs. However, as soon as funding pressures were 
eased, either because of alternative sources of support or the improving domestic economic situation, the 
commitments agreed in country programs were not met and reforms were not implemented. It was usually the 
economic and institutional reforms that could have eliminated opportunities for rent-accumulation for ruling 
elites, for example, in the energy and banking sectors, or that could have threatened societal support for the 
ruling elites by exposing the real costs of policies, that were left unimplemented.   
 
The repeated termination of half-implemented agreements and signing of new ones with an emphasis on the 
same fiscal and economic stabilization measures, privatization, liberalization, reform of state owned enterprises, 
and streamlining of regulation for different sectors of the economy, might covey the impression that there has 
been little change in the approaches and strategies of the IFIs. This would, however, be an incorrect conclusion 
to draw. The IMF and the WB went through an important learning process as a result of their involvement in the 
aforementioned EaP countries. The key lessons drawn from their experiences in cooperating with these countries 
have been: the perceived need for politically inclusive dialogue to broaden the potential support for country 
programs; the need for strengthening of reform ownership; and greater emphasis on tackling corruption to 
improve governance. Increasing the focus on institutional and regulatory reforms that could reduce incentives 
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for corruption and opportunities for rent-seeking has gradually become exceedingly important in the cases of 
Ukraine and Moldova, thus altering the overall strategies of the IFIs.  
 
The record of their involvement also seems to provide the basis to argue that the coordinated efforts of external 
providers of financial and technical support can have an important impact on economic and institutional reforms 
(some analysts estimate that in the case of Ukraine, international partners’ conditionality contributed to 23 % of 
its reform index score (Vox Ukraine 2017)). However, it will ultimately depend on the domestic situation, and in 
particular on the calculations of the ruling elites as well as pressure from civil society, whether these external 
resources and incentives can tip the balance towards transition. This is also in consideration of the presence of 
alternative sources of external support offering softer conditionality that does not threaten the dominant 
position of elites. A genuine transition would need to involve opening up of the economy, a reform of state 
institutions to make them more transparent, efficient and impartial, as well as the reduction of incentives and 
opportunities for rent-accumulation, thus promoting the dispersion of economic gains to wider segments of 
society. 
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